Freedom through Critique: Thoreau's Service to Others by Marshall, Mason
Mason Marshall
Freedom through Critique:
Thoreau's Service to Others
Not till we are lost, in other words, not till we have lost the world, do we
bejfin to find ourselves, and realize where we are and the infinite
extent of our relations.
—Thoreau, Walden
[M]ake them hunters ... mighty hunters at last ... hunters as well as
fishers of men.
—Thoreau, Walden
It is no wonder that Thoreau's detractors often see him as antisocial and
nearly misanthropic. Throughout Walden, for example, he moves back and
forth between recounting his solitary experiments in the woods and sharply
critiquing the lives his contemporaries lead. Of course, delight and optimism
shine through his descriptions of building a house, taking walks, and bathing
in the pond, but his critiques are pointed enough that two intellectual
historians call Walden "a diatribe against the life of the village and the farm."'
Thoreau's readers can justifiably ask why he returns so often to writing about
the meagerness of other people's lives. Why, say, in Walden does he repeatedly
interrupt his account of hoeing beans to indict everyone else? If his society
corrupts its members and nature is restorative, why not leave the society
behind and concentrate just on communing with nature.'^ An obvious
conclusion to draw is that Thoreau is crankily focused as much on getting free
from human culture as he is on getting free/or a better way of living.
It is possible, though, to take a more charitable view of his critiques of
contemporary life. I want to suggest in this paper that they generally reflect an
appropriate and carefully designed approach to guiding his readers toward a
way of life which he deems ideal.^ His approach is appropriate given what that
way of life is. To guide his readers properly by his standards, Thoreau has to
emphasize negative freedom at least as much as positive freedom.
Concentrating on negative freedom, as it is typically understood, we look
backward at hindrances to get away/row; when attending to positive freedom,
we gaze forward toward the better lives that liberation should afford.
Ultimately, though, Thoreau levels his critiques in the interest of getting us
free for what he considers ideal. First and foremost, his critiques represent an
attempt to perform a service to other people.
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Like certain recent commentators,'' I read his writings here as a revival of
the traditions of "spiritual guidance" in ancient philosophy, traditions he quite
likely was familiar with in being heavily conversant with ancient thought.^
Guidance in those traditions was spiritual not in a religious sense, but insofar
as it was aimed at the transformation of the whole self. The goal of self-
transformation was central to ancient philosophy. In fact, "Ancient philosophy
was, above all, help with life's problems and spiritual guidance, and the ancient
philosopher was, above all, a spiritual guide [kathe^emon]. Only secondarily —
namely, insofar as this was considered essential to spiritual guidance — was
ancient philosophy a theoretical explanation of the world."* Cicero, for
example — whose writings Thoreau was well acquainted with — offers
guidance in part by setting himself up as an exemplar to be imitated (for
example, in De ojficiis, 1.22.77). His choice to do so fits with the ancient view
that studying how certain exemplars acted virtuously in particular
circumstances can over time help cultivate in us a capacity to tell which actions
are best in a given situation. As Cicero sometimes does, Lucretius often aims
to have therapeutic effects on his readers. For example, in De rerum natura —
which Thoreau also read — Lucretius makes his descriptions of war
horrifyingly violent in ways that should jolt us into recognizing our own
tendencies toward aggression and into reining them in. Ideally, as a result our
everyday lives will change: taking up philosophy, we will spend each day trying
"to build affectionate relationships" with family, friends, and society, working
"to limit and manage [our] own desires," and avoiding the harm that others
might inflict on us.''
The paradigmatic ancient spiritual guide probably is the figure of Socrates
who appears in Plato's dialogues.* To get a sense of some often overlooked
aspects of his psychagqgia ("soul-leading"), consider a move he makes in the
Euthyphro. Upon asking Euthyphro whether piety is what it is because the
gods love it or the gods love it because it is pious, he offers a series of analogies
(lOa-c), raising the question, for example, of whether a seen thing is seen
because someone sees it or someone sees it because it is seen. He does so
simply to try to confuse Euthyphro and thereby render him more compliant.
The analogies have the logical force of a cloud of dust
in the face. ... It is consistent to claim that a seen thing
is seen because someone sees it, a beloved thing is
beloved because someone loves it, and piety is pious
because the gods love it. The multiplicity of analogies
Socrates throws at Euthyphro, as well as their lack of
logical and persuasive force, suggest that Socrates does
not intend a straightforward refutation of Euthyphro.'
Rather than aiming at refutation, Socrates employs rhetoric since it stands to
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be a more effective means of ultimately leading Euthyphro toward a life of
examination.
As especially the examples of Lucretius and Socrates should make clear,
philosophers in antiquity often used fmely honed rhetorical devices to guide
other people to self-transformation and, in turn, certain ways of life. In this
paper, I focus on the extent to which Thoreau in related ways carries out "an
act of communication.''''^^ My main contribution is to point to the importance
of critique in his approach," using the concern about his solitariness as an
occasion for exploring his mode of communication. Responding below to the
concern, I first piece together his account of how one can genuinely benefit
other people, and I then point to his attempts to help others in a way that
coheres with that account. The discussion leads into an explanation of why his
critiques are appropriate.
/. What People Need Most
It takes only a short search in Thoreau's writings to find rather biting
comments about the culture that surrounds him. Some of them are well-
known, such as his remark that "The mass of men lead lives of quiet
desperation."'^ Though that line may reflect concern for other people, he can
seem mainly antipathetic toward them when, for example, he writes,
denouncing conformity, that "The greater number of men are merely
corporals,"^^ when he frets that "[W]herever a man goes, men will pursue and
paw him with their dirty institutions, and, if they can, constrain him to belong
to their desperate odd-fellow society,"'* and when he cries: "Give me a
wildness whose glance no civilization can endure. ..."'^ Seclusion may appear
to be what he wants the most.
In line with what we might thus expect, one of Thoreau's contemporaries
who knew him personally deemed him a "consecrated crank."'* Even Emerson
regretted the extent of Thoreau's solitariness. Early critic James Russell Lowell
writes that Thoreau "finds none of the activities which attract or employ the
rest of mankind worthy of him," and Robert Louis Stevenson charges that
Thoreau's "ruling passion was to keep himself unspotted from the world."'^ A
more recent critic writes in a similar vein:
Thoreau countered his alienation by cultivating what
[Erik] Erikson calls a "negative identity," in which a
tenuous sense of self is "expressed in a scornful and
snobbish hostility toward the roles offered as proper
and desirable in one's family or immediate
community." Acutely sensitive to Concord's judgment
of him, Thoreau responded by disparaging his
townsmen en masse and defining himself by what he
was not. ... Thoreau never felt himself — never
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brushed up against the distinguishing contours of his
being — unless he had a negative reference point for
self-affirmation.'*
Perhaps most strikingly, in a recent book on Thoreau, an advocate of his
thought deems him
sadly removed from the social world of other human
beings. In short, Thoreau's vision ... remained
communally myopic and thereby restricted to a world
of his own making. Others were simply not particularly
germane for him. ... Thoreau cut a sorry figure. ...
[Emerson's unflattering appraisal of him after the two
had parted ways] was not solely the assessment of an
antagonist but seems to have been a general opinion,
one Thoreau himself recognized as widely held. ...
Thoreau reciprocated the quiet hostility of his
neighbors. ... [He had] self-centered, asocial
inclinations. ..."
Why does it make sense to think, in spite of these common impressions, that
Thoreau tries to perform a service to other people.'^"
First, he suggests that he has a strong sense of responsibility to them, and
there is reason to believe him. Readers are often prone to think he is
preoccupied with himself, since he can seem to be heavily concerned with
refashioning himself just for the sake of his own fulfillment. Thoreau does
work intensely at remaking himself in order to improve his life. He also seems
far from immune to the fear that he is too self-involved and neglects other
people. In one entry in his journal, he writes: "I must confess I have felt mean
enough when asked how I was to act on society — what errand I had to
mankind. Undoubtedly I did not feel mean without a reason. ..." Nevertheless,
he immediately adds that "[Mjy loitering is not without defence."^' In
explaining why in the rest of the journal entry, he hardly denies having social
responsibilities; in fact, he suggests he is deeply committed to helping others:
"I know no riches I would keep back. I have no private good — unless it be
my peculiar ability to serve the public. This is the only individual property."^^
In another work, he extends this invitation: "Use me, then, for I am useful in
my way, and stand as one of many petitioners ... supplicating to be put to my
use, if by any means ye may find me serviceable. ..."^^ Thoreau even goes so far
as to declare later in his journal: "I am not above being used, aye abused,
sometimes."^** In the earlier journal entry, for example, he simply maintains
that his "loitering" can best prepare him for the task of serving others — that
he can do the most good for them only by first enriching himself ̂ ^
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That sort of claim surfaces frequently in his writings. For example, in a
book review published in the year after he wrote the earlier journal entry, he
contends that one must reform oneself in order to reform society.^* Elsewhere
he insists that the best contribution a citizen can make to a community is not a
prudent vote at the polls or change in governmental policy, but an enhanced
self ^̂  In Walden, he says that to live harmoniously with other people "means
to^et our [own] living together" so that we arc not a hindrance to them;^* and
he makes tbe point bolder in another essay, exclaiming that the person worth
the most to others is the one "who is minding his own business'''' in the sense
not of leaving other people alone, but of responsibly taking care to cultivate
personal strengths.^' Thoreau leads us to think that one of his principal aims —
even especially in sculpting himself — is to become as useful as he can be to
others.
Granted, there are passages in his works that can seem to strongly suggest
otherwise. At one point, he writes: "I feel that my connection with and
obligation to society are still very slight and transient."'" But such lines simply
reflect Thoreau's rejection of conventional moral standards, particularly those
according to which an action is charitable. In refusing to follow them, he often
speaks in an ironic voice, calling an action "good" when it would meet
common expectations and "evil" when it would clash with them, and using
terms such as 'obligation' and 'character' in line with how his society tends to
use them. He does so at one point in Walden, for example, when he writes:
"As for Doing-good, that is one of the professions which are full. ... Probably I
should not consciously and deliberately forsake my particular calling to do the
good which society demands of me. ..."^' Why does he say he should not?
Philanthropy, as Thoreau calls it — meaning human actions that are
typically considered charitable — fails to help other people in the best way
possible.^^ On the one hand, philanthropists may tend to a person's physical
needs, such as hunger or thirst, or try to save the person from physical danger.
But Thoreau points out: "I can find you a Newfoundland dog that will do as
much."' ' On the other hand, a philanthropist may try to help the poor feel
better about themselves by, say, dressing them in more fashionable clothes and
granting them other luxuries prized by people who have more money than
they have. That also is beside the point. Often the poor are happy enough
without such luxuries,'* and even a poor person who would prefer to have
luxuries is better off without them insofar as they tend just to be
encumbrances.'^
Philanthropists and everyone else who goes about "Doing good" — that
is, who tries to be of service merely by following conventional standards of
morality — may on balance barm tbe needy person.'* For that reason,
philanthropy even is irresponsible. In one of his writings, Thoreau speaks to
"My most serene and irresponsible neighbors," saying, "let us see tbat we have
the whole advantage of each other; we will be useful, at least, if not admirable.
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to one another."'^ One can offer other people the whole advantage of oneself
not by doin£ good, but by bein£ good, as he puts it — in other words, by
crafting a rich life and thereby having genuine wealth to offer others.'* In
setting aside conventional morality to enrich ourselves as much as we can, we
may not gain the admiration of our neighbors, but we can end up with a gift
most worth giving them.' '
On Thoreau's account, the reason is that everyone needs most of all to
reach a "solid bottom," as he calls it.'*" He is not as precise here as we might
want him to be, but the solid or "hard" bottom, in any case, is what "we can
call reality, and say. This is, and no mistake. ..."*' When we hit bedrock, our
sense of being in contact vj'wh reality is so keen and unshakable that, for him, it
qualifies as knowledge. No doubt, this is not a sort of knowledge that consists
of propositions. On one occasion, Thoreau even says it amounts to nothing
"more definite than a novel and grand surprise on a sudden revelation of the
insufficiency of all that we had called Knowledge before. ..."''^ Nonetheless,
contrary to what he implies at an earlier stage in his thinking, it is more than
just "a consciousness of [one's] ignorance"*' — it is also "[a]n indefinite sence
[sic] of the grandeur and glory of the Universe. It is the lighting up of the mist
by the sun,"** illuminating who I am, what the world is, and bow I stand in
relation to it.
The mist is that which clouds our view of what lies beyond the mundane.*^
Accordingly, in the dawn, our lives become profoundly meaningful. Thoreau
suggests as much also when, for example, he promises almost hauntingly: "If
you stand right fronting and face to face to a fact, you will see tbe sun glimmer
on both its surfaces, as if it were a cimeter, and feel its sweet edge dividing you
through the heart and marrow, and so you will happily conclude your mortal
career. Be it life or death, we crave only reality."** Our craving reflects a
genuine need — in fact, a need which is deepest and most important to fulfill,
for not until we have knowledge are we in position to "begin," as he says.*^
What we can begin to do is live beautifully and fully.
II. Helping Others
If what people need most is the sort of knowledge just described, what,
according to Thoreau, does it take to genuinely help them.> Consider first what
he says gaining knowledge requires. On his account, there is no guarantee that
we will gain it, for we cannot bootstrap our way to it, methodically following
some clear-cut procedure. If knowledge comes to us at all, it does so only
through "lieferings [sudden revelations] from the gods," he says*" — "flashes
of light from heaven."*' It takes hold of us more than we take hold of it.
Nonetheless, we can be open or closed to knowledge to varying degrees.
In the picture Thoreau presents, we are most open to knowledge when, in
a certain respect, we are ignorant.^" He does not mean just that we have to lack
understanding in order to gain it. Rather, the point is that every person's
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overriding tendency is to slip into mental "ruts" and, in turn, fall into what
Thoreau calls sleep, a condition in which we are distracted to the extent of
being mindless.^* The more tightly we grip what we regard as our knowledge,
the deeper we sink into habits of unreflective thought;" inevitably, the
familiarity of routine numbs us and lulls us into slumber. Of course, what we
regard as our knowledge is only ersatz knowledge, on Thoreau's terms, and in
a strict sense, everyone who lacks knowledge proper is already ignorant. In the
sense implied here, though, to be ignorant is to have gotten out of one's
mental ruts." The term 'ignorant' is appropriate insofar as freedom from habit
comes with a price: our ersatz knowledge lends us a feeling of security, and
when jolted out of our comfortable routines, we are left disoriented. We grow
"lost" — we "have lost the world"^* — partly inasmuch as we no longer have a
handle on it cognitively. The experience is unsettling, yet if the shock of
disorientation awakens and sensitizes us enough to ourselves and the universe,
we ultimately become susceptible to its "grandeur and glory" (the "lighting up
of the mist by the sun"). We are exposed and vulnerable, but freer to gain
genuine knowledge.^^
It is because of what knowledge is that we have to be lost to gain it, as
Thoreau indicates: "At the same time that we are earnest to explore and learn
all things, we require that all things be mysterious and unexplorable, that land
and sea be infinitely wild, unsurveyed and unfathomed by us because
unfathomable''' (emphasis mine). Though it may seem odd for Thoreau to
suggest that we can come to the solid bottom only through encountering what
is Mwfathomable, his meaning grows clearer when he soon adds: "We need to
witness our own limits transgressed. ..."^* Recall that when I reach bedrock, I
am struck by the grandeur and glory of the universe. To sense its grandeur and
glory, I have to be overwhelmed by its vastness and depth — such that I see
my cognitive limits transgressed. When I do so, I can fmd the universe great
enough to leave my life profoundly meaningful. In that sense, infinitude
grounds me. What I fathom is the extent to which the universe escapes my
understanding and, in turn, proves to be extraordinary.
By getting and staying sufFiciendy awake through escaping and avoiding
mental ruts, one can render oneself as amenable as possible to the "sudden
revelations" through which knowledge comes to us.^'' The most promising
means of keeping out of mental ruts is living "deliberately," as Thoreau puts
it.^' To live deliberately is to take possession of one's life by being constantly
mindful of what one does and why one does it and by thoughtfully choosing
the ends one seeks. Making thoughtful choices requires genuinely considering
all options — all directions in which to "walk," in Thoreau's language.^' In
such honest reflection, we face what he calls wilderness — foreign, uncharted
territory. There we can grow lost enough to gain knowledge.*"
We resist heading toward the wilderness, even though "a subtle
magnetism" — our craving for reality — draws us there.*' To head in that
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direction is to depart from civilization. Although, to repeat, we are predisposed
to fixity in general, we are especially inclined to get stuck since we generally
"belong to the community," to use Thoreau's phrase." What that means is
that by failing to think for ourselves, we tend to be unduly influenced by other
people and by what is deemed "common sense."*^
Take, for example, our typical assumption that it is poindess to try to
figure out what is best, since answers would always prove too elusive. In
programmatic passages in Walden., Thoreau compares that assumption to the
common belief among people in nearby Concord that Walden Pond is
bottomless. That belief itself is groundless: he says about the pond that he
"fathomed it easily" and found unmistakably that it has a bottom.** But
revealingly, his contemporaries believe the pond is bottomless because "There
have been many stories told about the bottom, or rather no bottom, of this
pond. ..."*' The people who treat those stories as ftilly reliable do not
investigate on their own whether the pond has a bottom. Similarly, to a large
degree we presume that serious reflection is pointless because it is rumored to
be and we scarcely think for ourselves.
Even if we think there may be some point in seeking answers, we
commonly presume that it is not logistically feasible to search in earnest —
that, say, one could not earn an adequate living while devoting enough time to
reflection. We take that for granted because it seems to us imperative to have
enough money to buy what is widely valued, as Thoreau laments in Walden:
I sometimes try my acquaintances by such tests as this;
— who could wear a patch, or two extra seams only,
over the knee.> Most behave as if they believed that
their prospects for life would be ruined if they should
do it. It would be easier for them to hobble to town
with a broken leg than with a broken pantaloon. Often
if an accident happens to a gendeman's legs, they can
be mended; but if a similar accident happens to the
legs of his pantaloons, there is no help for it; for he
considers, not what is truly respectable, but what is
respected.**
Often, we even cling to our ersatz knowledge — whether it is "common
sense" or scientific expertise — because it affords us a share of our society's
respect.*^ In fact, our lives overall usually conform to what most people
esteem.
It is, of course, well-known that Thoreau decries conformity, but I should
emphasize why, on his account, he does so, since his reason points to another
key respect in which we must lose the world. Aware that our culture places a
premium on stylishness, for example, we favor "unpatched clothes" even over
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having "a sound conscience."*^ In doing so, we become not simply beholden
to other people, but enslaved to them. Slavery, Thoreau writes, "is not the
peculiar institution of the South. It exists wherever men are bought and sold,
wherever a man allows himself to be made a mere thing or a tool, and
surrenders his inalienable rights of reason and conscience. Indeed, this slavery is
more complete than that which enslaves the body alone."*' Much as Emerson
calls for self-reliance, declaring, for example, that "[limitation is suicide,"''"
Thoreau urges his reader to be independent: "Every path but your own is the
path of fate. Keep on your own track, then."''' The fate we risk suffering is
nothing less than to miss out on living while staying fast asleep.''^ After all,
whenever we have surrendered our faculties of critical discernment and self-
government, we are ill-equipped to get out of our mental ruts so as to awaken.
In thinking for ourselves, we gain our soul and are in position to lose the
world in the sense of growing disoriented. There again is a cost, since we lose
the world in an additional respect: we forfeit the comfort and commendation
that come with belonging to the community; when we head into the
wilderness, we ourselves grow wild to a certain extent.^' Nevertheless, losing
the world in this additional respect allows us to ultimately lose it in the former
sense of growing disoriented.
Accordingly, Thoreau suggests that to genuinely help other people, one
must free them from the community so that they each can follow their own
paths. Philanthropy, for example, often does more harm than good because it
stems from the view that people are urgendy needy when they lack what the
community esteems, so philanthropy tends to convey or reinforce the
assumption that what the community esteems most highly really is most
important. That is why Thoreau says that the "example" that the
philanthropist sets for the needy generally "leaves them far behind. ... You
boast of spending a tenth part of your income in charity; may be you should
spend the nine tenths so, and done with it."^* If I gave up my wealth and took
up a life of "voluntary poverty,"^^ I would strike "at the root" of human
problems instead of merely "hacking at the branches"^* — for my actions
would reflect the conviction that luxuries and prestige hardly matter most, and
I could serve as an exemplary model of an individual who finds his own way. It
is in that regard that I would "6e good," to use Thoreau's language, instead of
just "doing good." As he urges us to do, I would "spend [my]self,"^^ instead
of just my money and time, on helping other people: I would enrich myself
insofar as I regained and cultivated my independence, and by doing so, I
would help other people far more than by, say, tending to their physical needs
or helping them look more fashionable.^*
III. Thoreau as Exemplar
Given that Thoreau claims all this, we can understandably expect him to
try to serve as that sort of exemplar, and the fact that he does so suggests, in
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part, that he is, indeed, driven to enrich other people by freeing them from the
community. To argue that his actions cohere with his claims about what it
takes to genuinely help others, I want to point to two examples of his attempt
to unveil an ideal through his own life — an attempt which is somewhat like
Cicero's and other ancient philosophers' efforts to model virtue. Since the
examples involve certain essays Thoreau wrote — namely, Walden and
"Resistance to Civil Covernment" (or, "Civil Disobedience") — I should first
say a bit about the approach I take here.
After all, in his writings Thoreau clearly enough means to offer more than
just a literal record of his choices and experiences. In Walden., for example, he
himself acknowledges that he puts "the best face on the matter."^' In
"Resistance to Civil Government," he explains in rather grand and dramatic
terms that he was arrested and spent a night in jail for refusing to pay certain
taxes, and that he refused in part because he believed the government had
acted unjustly in imprisoning Native Americans, black fugitive slaves, and
prisoners of the current war with Mexico. Yet no doubt, Thoreau's refusal to
pay certain taxes in July of 1846 was not as daring or extraordinary as his
account in the essay can lead readers to think. About three years earlier,
Bronson Alcott and later one of his friends had been arrested when they each
had made the same political gesture, and upon their arrests one of Concord's
most prominent citizens had paid their taxes for them so that they had soon
been released. The constable who arrested Thoreau, Sam Staples, even tried to
spare him from jail, offering to pay his taxes for him.
Despite how relatively tame Thoreau's venture into activism was, at some
point before Staples tried to release him from his cell in the morning Thoreau
apparendy had come to hope the incident would end up being an instructive
exhibition for other people. When Staples told him he was to be released,
Thoreau grew furious: he wanted to be kept in jail longer so that his arrest and
confmement would be more striking to observers. Since the reason he was to
be released was that someone had paid his taxes for him after his arrest, he
insisted that he should have to stay in jail since it was not he who had paid.""
So in any case, it is not surprising that in crafting "Resistance to Civil
Government," for example, he used the "facts" of his life "only ... as the frame
to my pictures," to quote from a comment he offers elsewhere about his work
in general — that is, he made them "material to the mythology I am writing,"
one which was supposed to influence other people.*' To gauge whether his
actions line up with his claims about what it takes to genuinely help others, it
makes the most sense to look at what the mythology consists of and, in turn,
reveals its specific purpose to be; for constructing such a mythology is just as
much an action as, say, engaging in political activism is, and Thoreau, in fact,
treated the former sort of action as more important in his case than the latter
sort. Granted, there is fairly solid evidence that, for example, he often served as
a conductor on the Underground Railroad and went to considerable lengths
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to help black fugitive slaves; yet what he mainly devoted his life to is not
activism, but writing — even though it was by no means his main source of
income. Consider, then, two pictures he paints.
First, especially in Walden, he depicts his life as centered on philosophical
examination. In explaining early in Walden why he went to the woods — what
his chief motivation was — he says that he wanted "to front only the essential
facts of life, and see if I could not learn what it had to teach ... and, if it proved
to be mean, why then to get the whole and genuine meanness of it ... or if it
were sublime, to know it by experience. ..."^^ He identifies his endeavor as
philosophical in the fullest sense: it entails loving wisdom so much "as to live
according to its dictates" and solving "some of the problems of life, not only
theoretically, but practically."" Thoreau lives by wisdom's dictates insofar as
he does what it takes to be in position to gain knowledge. For example, he
tries to make himself more amenable to lieferings (sudden revelations) by
"simplifying" his life in the sense of clearing away distractions.** It is significant
that the title of the first chapter of Walden is "Economy" and that he laments
in that chapter that "Even the poor student is taught only political economy,
while that economy of living which is synonymous with philosophy [emphasis
mine] is not even sincerely professed in our colleges."*^ He views even his
logistical simplification of life as fundamentally and wholly philosophical.**
Inasmuch as his project thus embodies the ancient Greek and Roman view that
wisdom is an understanding of how to live a life that is good to live, it
represents a return to philosophy's roots.*^
Thoreau not only claims to center his life on philosophical examination,
but also urges other people to take up examined lives. His call for everyone
else to privilege examination is especially loud when, for example, he exclaims:
"Let us spend our lives in conceiving then."** For that matter, he can even
seem to take on a sharply moralistic tone when in bewailing in another work
the coming loss of wild apples and warning that domesticated apples are poor
substitutes, he invokes condemnatory lines from the Old Testament, such as
the following: "Be ye ashamed, O ye husbandmen! howl, O ye vine-
dressers! ... the apple-tree, even all the trees of the field, are withered."" That
is relevant here for at least two reasons. For one, he celebrates wildness and
suggests that serious reflection is integral to maximizing it.'" For another, the
wild apples that grow near Concord — like Thoreau — have "strayed into the
woods from the cultivated stock," and yet are "most civilized" in a certain
regard."
Let me turn now to "Resistance to Civil Government." Contrary to what
we might expect, Thoreau writes in this essay that he does not aim to win the
support of a majority of his fellow citizens for the cause of emancipating the
Native Americans, black fugitive slaves, and prisoners of the current war with
Mexico who reside in American jails. The reason he gives is illuminating: "A
wise man," he says, "will not ... wish to prevail through the power of the
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majority," since "There is but little virtue in the action of masses of men.'"^ If
it mattered most to him to see Native Americans, black fugitive slaves, and
Mexicans released, he could work through the judicial system or adopt other
"ways that the State has provided for remedying the evil,"" but in the essay he
says he also rejects that option. Here again his reason is telling: "I have other
affairs to attend to. I came into this world, not chiefly to make this a good
place to live in, but to live in it, be it good or bad."'* His main responsibility,
to repeat, is not to do good, but to be good by living richly. He rebuffs
"philanthropy" in the essay, as he does elsewhere, again trumpeting the
importance of "giv[ing one]self entirely to [one's] fellow-men" instead of "giv
[ing one]self partially to them."'^
There is no question that in his writings, Thoreau acknowledges that he
thinks black slaves and Mexican and Native American prisoners should be set
free. He even says in Walden that he "helped to forward to the northstar" a
"real runaway slave."'* But again, his claim is that the sort of slavery in which
"a man allows himself to be made a mere thing or a tool, and surrenders his
inalienable rights of reason and conscience" is "more complete than that which
enslaves the body alone.""' When in Walden he reports that he helped to free a
runaway slave, apparently meaning someone who was fleeing the Southern
institution of black slavery, he does so in a context in which he also writes, for
example, that citizens "have become the tools of their tools"; that he is
inclined to think they "are not so much the keepers of herds as herds are" their
keepers; that "We do not ride upon the railroad; it rides upon us"; and that "I
sometimes wonder that we can be so frivolous, I may almost say, as to attend
to the gross but somewhat foreign form of servitude called Negro Slavery,
there are so many keen and subtle masters that enslave both north and south.
It is hard to have a southern overseer; it is worse to have a northern one; but
worst of all when you are the slave-driver of yourself "'* Physical bondage and
enslavement are bad, he maintains, but the people who need the most help are
those who have surrendered their "reason and conscience" to the community's
dictates which they have internalized.
What he writes in "Resistance to Civil Government" reflects that idea. As
he portrays them, taxpayers outside of jail are less free than the Native
Americans, black fugitive slaves, and Mexican soldiers in jail are. To pay taxes
to a government which behaves unjustly is to be complicit with that
government and thus to "resign [one's] conscience to tbe legislator."" It is to
be a slave — or, a "subject," as he puts it here, observing: "The mass of men
serve the State thus, not as men mainly, but as machines. ..."""' For certain
reasons, people who are in jail can be much freer than subjects are. For one, in
an obvious respect prisoners have often landed in jail to begin with as a result
of retaining and exercising their capacities for self-government. Many fugitive
slaves, for example, refused to ascribe authority to laws which forbid them to
flee.
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More important, from jail I can see the world far more clearly, growing
more inclined to reclaim my autonomy. In being put in jail, I may directly
experience some of the injustice that my government commits; as a result, my
consciousness of the need to combat the injustice can be heightened, and my
resolve to combat it can be strengthened."" Further, I am likely to feel
distanced from the government which put me in jail and from the culture
which is complicit with that government; accordingly, I can view the world
afresh. Consider part of Thoreau's description of his time in jail, which here is
worth quoting at length:
It was like traveling into a far country, such as I had
never expected to behold, to lie there for one night. It
seemed to me that I never had heard the town-clock
strike before, nor the evening sounds of the village; for
we slept with the windows open, which were inside
the grating. It was to see my native village in the light
of the middle ages, and our Concord was turned into a
Rhine stream, and visions of knights and castles passed
before me. They were the voices of old burghers that I
heard in the streets. I was an involuntary spectator and
auditor of whatever was done and said in the kitchen
of the adjacent village-inn, — a wholly new and rare
experience to me. It was a closer view of my native
town. I was fairly inside of it. I never had seen its
institutions before.'"^ This is one of its peculiar
institutions; for it is a shire town. I began to
comprehend what its inhabitants were about.'"'
In a critical sense, one can get freer by going to jail. In fact, it is highly
significant that in Walden, Thoreau rather fondly recounts his time in jail
immediately after emphasizing the importance of having "lost the world."'"*
In line with those claims, the chief concern that emerges in "Resistance to
Civil Government" is to liberate the mass of taxpayers who mindlessly serve
the State and, in turn, sleep through their lives. In the essay, Thoreau presents
his opposition to slavery and the current war with Mexico as just occasions for
his opposition to the government; for the main question he addresses is this:
given that he is at odds with the majority of his society, what should he choose
to do.* His answer, of course, is that he has a genuine obligation to carry out
what he thinks is right, and "[A]ny man more right than his neighbors,
constitutes a majority of one already."'"^ In other words, he must follow his
own path without depending upon others to validate it. That is the core of the
reason he gives for refusing to pay certain taxes — and he maintains that it is
best for all citizens to break ties with an unjust government in the way he
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In fact, Thoreau also suggests the most pressing need is for them to get
free, for he pivotally declares that even ii just ''one HONEST man, in this State
of Massachusetts, ceasing to hold slaves., were actually to withdraw from [his]
copartnership [with the government], and be locked up in the county jail
therefor, it would be the abolition of slavery in America."'"^ At first, it may
seem that the reason it matters most whether citizens resist the government is
that they have the most power to reform it. But Thoreau, as he emphasizes,
refers here to just "-one HONEST man," and his promise in the essay is that
the government would have to mend its ways at least somewhat if the number
of conscientious citizens who refused to pay taxes grew large enough to
burden the government. How could it help, then, for just one person to go to
jail for refusing to pay taxes? Thoreau must mean that as a citizen who took a
stand against the majority of other citizens, I could escape my own slavery. He
indicates as much even more clearly in writing a few pages earlier, for example,
that when eventually a majority of citizens abolish slavery with their votes,
''They will then be the only slaves. Only his vote can hasten the abolition of
slavery who asserts his own freedom [emphasis mine] by his vote."'"' On
Thoreau's account, taking a stand against the majority would not necessarily
preclude me from reforming the government, since enough other citizens
might join me in my stand, reclaiming their own autonomy. The main point,
though, is not to reform the government, but to be free from the most
pernicious kind of slavery — that in which one abnegates one's "reason and
conscience." Thoreau would incite me to withhold tax money and go to jail to
get myself freer.
So in the picture he presents in "Resistance to Civil Government," he
refuses to pay certain taxes both to preserve his capacity for self-government
and to ultimately provoke his readers to recover their autonomy, acting on the
notion that it is the autonomous individual who can be of genuine service to
others. In the passage in which he claims that just "one HONEST man" could
bring about "the abolition of slavery in America," he even adds: "For ... what
is once well done is done/or ev^r""" Quite significandy, that reference to the
everlasting ties into an important theme in Walden, among other essays he
writes. There he says that "In any weather, at any hour of the day or night, I
have been anxious to improve the nick of time ...", and that "That time which
we really improve, or which is improvable, is neither past, present, nor
future."''" What really matters, he suggests in those lines and surrounding
passages, is to improve our relation to the eternal — to enhance the extent to
which we are free enough to come to stand firmly on the infinitude of the
solid bottom which renders one's life profoundly meaningful. Everything else
— what we own, enslavement or imprisonment of the body, the state of the
government — matters just insofar as it affects whether we are free in that
respect.'" Thoreau's "proper work," as he calls it,"-^ thus centers on following
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his own path and, in turn, spurring other people to follow theirs. The project
of reforming the government and improving other features strictly of our
"temporal" existence comes only after the task of enhancing our relation to
the eternal.
He acts consistently with that idea in crafting all his writings, even "Slavery
in Massachusetts" and other essays that follow "Resistance to Civil
Government" and are commonly thought"^ to mark a shift in his focus. In
"Slavery in Massachusetts," for example, penned when fugitive slave Anthony
Burns had been returned to Virginia under the 1851 Fugitive Slave Law and
antagonism between North and South was steadily growing, Thoreau can
sound far angrier about "enslavement of the body," and he writes such lines as
the following:
[M]y old and worthiest pursuits have lost I cannot say
how much of their attraction, and I feel that my
investment in life here is worth many per cent, less ...
No prudent man will build a stone house under these
circumstances, or engage in any peacefiil enterprise
which it requires a long time to accomplish. ... life is
more interrupted and less available to a man's proper
pursuits."*
It might seem as if here he revokes his claim that reaching a solid bottom
matters most. But while his attention does shift somewhat in light of recent
events, the claim about the paramount importance of knowledge stands
securely intact. In fact, Thoreau suggests that what so troubles him about the
government's recent misdeeds and the very reason they demand attention is
that they impede proper work. "I walk toward one of our ponds," he grieves,
"but what signifies the beauty of nature when men are base? ... The
remembrance of my country spoils my walk.""^ The problem with the return
of Anthony Burns to enslavement is that "[T]o some extent, the State has
fatally interfered with my lawful business. ... it has interrupted me and every
man on his onward and upward path. ...""* Thoreau's lawful business of freely
following his own path involves at times helping others escape physical
enslavement. So as one critic comments, the "underlying rationale for protest"
in the essay "rests on Thoreau's outrage that his own freedom ha[s] been
compromised — not that of Burns!""'' The present situation needs to be
remedied so that it will be possible again to follow one's path unhindered.
Nonetheless, referring in a closing paragraph to his rightful pursuits that
lead him into nature, Thoreau adds that "I shall not so soon despair of the
world for" the white water-lily that symbolizes purity,"* and he continues his
proper work to some extent, prompting others to reclaim their autonomy as he
exercises his. In the essay, he echoes principal themes found in "Resistance to
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Civil Government," stressing that the individual who is right has more
authority than the errant majority does; invoking the notion of one's relation
to eternity; calling for "each inhabitant of the State [to] dissolve his union
with her, as long as she delays to do her duty"; maintaining that what matters
is not which votes are cast, but what the character of each voter is; and
insisting that "What should concern Massachusetts is not the Nebraska Bill,
nor the Fugitive Slave Bill, but her own slaveholding and servility."'" Though
still somewhat impeded, Thoreau's proper work carries over even into such
later essays as the ones he writes on John Brown. Not only is Brown militant
against the evils that hinder Thoreau on his onward and upward path, but also
Brown's heroism, on Thoreau's terms, lies to a substantial degree in his "arch
individualism," to quote another commentator:
[For Brown] God's favorite number is the number
one: one righteous man. ... [Brown] imagined "one
bold and to some extent successful man ... defending
his rights in good earnest," then being put on "trial
for life," finally to be "hanged, if [he] must," all of
which would "arouse ... sympathy throughout the
nation," for "nothing so charms the American people
as personal bravery." ... Brown's style ... was to work
alone and in secret, never showing any interest, for
example, in working with others involved in the
struggle to make Kansas a Free-Soil state.'^^
So in praising Brown, Thoreau in large part reemphasizes the importance of
the autonomous individual.
In short, his actions overall cohere with his claim that the best way to help
others, is to enrich oneself. First and foremost, he propounds a mythology
which is geared to incite his readers to reclaim and preserve their autonomy. In
Walden, for example, he depicts his life as centered on philosophical
examination, calling for others also to take up examination in spite of the
"commonsensical" view that it is futile. Similarly, in "Resistance to Civil
Government," he profiles his stand against the majority, recounting his refusal
to pay taxes and urging his readers also to break ties with an unjust
government. In key part, he performs his service to others by trying to be an
exemplary model of an individual who is not a slave or subject, following his
own path.
IV. Dimming the Lodestar
At this point, a question arises, and it is pivotal since it leads toward the
reasons that Thoreau's critiques are appropriate. In line with the idea that it is
vital never to be a slave or subject by abnegating one's reason or conscience.
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he makes such disclaimers as this: "I do not mean to prescribe rules to strong
and valiant natures, who will mind their own affairs whether in heaven or
hell... ."'̂ ^ But does he not presume to tell us what we should do.> As I remark
above, he maintains that examination is best for everyone, and he says that all
taxpayers ought to dissolve ties with an unjust government. Of course, perhaps
he means to prescribe rules only to natures who are not "strong and valiant."
Yet he is eager to stress: "I would not have any one adopt my mode of living
on any account. I would have each [person] be very careful to find out and
pursue his own way, and not his father's or his mother's or his neighbor's
instead."'^^ How are we to account for this apparent inconsistency?
Consider first the importance of exaggeration or extravagance in Thoreau.
I have already noted that he writes mythologies, instead of just literal records
of his choices and experiences, but there is more to add. In a long passage near
the end of Walden, he salutes ''•Extra va^anceF, confessing: "I fear chiefly lest
my expression may not be extra- vacant enough, may not wander far enough
beyond the narrow limits of my daily experience, so as to be adequate to the
truth of which I have been convinced. ... I am convinced that I cannot
exaggerate enough even to lay the foundation of a true expression."'" That
sentiment is not isolated in his writings. For example, near the beginning of
"Walking," he writes: "I wish to make an extreme statement. ..."'^'' Relatedly,
observing in an essay published earlier that author Thomas Cariyle gives
exaggerated accounts of figures in history, Thoreau makes a revealing
pronouncement:
Exaggeration! was ever any virtue attributed to a man
without exaggeration? was ever any vice, without
infinite exaggeration? Do we not exaggerate ourselves
to ourselves, or do we recognize ourselves for the
actual men we are? Are we not all great men? Yet what
are we actually to speak of) We live by exaggeration,
what else is it to anticipate more than we enjoy? The
lightning is an exaggeration of the light. Exaggerated
history is poetry, and truth referred to a new standard.
To a small man every greater is an exaggeration. He
who cannot exaggerate is not qualified to utter truth.
No truth we think was ever expressed but with this
sort of emphasis, so that for the time there seemed to
be no '̂ ^
By the "new standard" of truth which Thoreau mentions here, "It takes two
to speak the truth," as he claims elsewhere, " — one to speak, and another to
hear."'^* The reason is that the account I offer you is true only insofar as it
conduces to your improvement. In that respect, to utter truth is to "speak a
412 Mason Marshall
^00^ word," in Thoreau's languagc.'^^ It is to draw other people toward better
lives.'̂ «
Why, according to Thoreau, does one have to exaggerate or be
extravagant in order to meet the new standard.' On the one hand, true
accounts are extravagant relative to the norms of the community to which
those people typically belong.'^' According to those norms, statements must
be determinate."" But knowledge, as Thoreau portrays it, cannot be signified
in definite terms. (Hence, he asks in the passage quoted above fi-om the essay
on Thomas Carlyle: "Yet what arc we actually to speak of>") The most
meaningful experience is private enough that it may be even wholly
incommunicable.'^' We can witness to the sense with which it leaves us, but
our ability to evoke the same sense in other persons is profoundly limited.
Anyone who is awake enough to sense the "glory and grandeur of the
Universe" will appreciate the extent to which determinate expressions are
inadequate to represent it.'^^ To everyone else who listens, though, statements
which are true and thus, by necessity, indefinite are extravagant.'^^
On the other hand, most sleepers scarcely hear what one says. Only
"shouting" can get the message across to them.'^* While drowsiness still clouds
their vision and they see nothing beyond their trivial concerns, someone else
must prompt them to set their sights higher if they are to have much hope of
waking up. To point their vision high enough, one has to exaggerate.'^'
Thomas Carlyle, for example, "creates you an ideal hero" only by giving an
exaggerated account ofa historical figure's merits.''* Nonetheless, his account
is true inasmuch as it can help improve other people by presenting an ideal
worth aspiring to.
Thoreau thus claims that one must be able to exaggerate in order to be
qualified to utter truth. His claim may seem straightforward enough. But
notice a crucial implication of it. Since it comes from him, it makes sense for us
to suspect that he himself exaggerates. As if to heighten our suspicion, he
chooses strong wording in, for example, a passage quoted above from the essay
on Thomas Carlyle: "was ever any virtue attributed to a man without
exaggeration.' was ever any vice, without infinite exaggeration.' ... Are we not
all great men.'" (emphasis mine). Moreover, in "Walking" and Walden, he
explicitly says that he aims to make extreme and extravagant claims, and
elsewhere, mentioning "exaggerations," he exclaims: "I have no respect for
facts even except when I would use them, and for the most part I am
independent of those which I hear, and can afford to be inaccurate, or, in
other words, to substitute more present and pressing facts in their place."'^^ If
people warn us that they are likely to exaggerate, we have good reason to put
much less stock in whatever they say, or at least to take whatever they say far
more cautiously. We, of course, have good reason to take cautiously even their
claim that one has to be able to exaggerate in order to be qualified to utter
truth. Thoreau seems well aware of that principle and of the effect he can
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accordingly have in vowing to exaggerate. Near the end of a 10 April 1853
letter to Harrison Blake in which he makes bold proclamations, he writes: "I
trust that you realize what an exaggerator I am, — that I lay myself out to
exaggerate whenever I have an opportunity., — pile Pelion upon Ossa, to reach
heaven so. Expect no trivial truth from me, unless I am on the witness-stand. I
will come as near to lying as you can drive a coach-and-four."''* Revealingly,
in letters to Blake, he insists that one must be foolish not to pursue a life of
simplicity and examination.'''
If Thoreau thus leads us to think that he himself exaggerates, what are we
to make of the ideal he erects? Given that he tries to serve as an exemplar, it
should be obvious enough that in works such as "Resistance to Civil
Government" and Walden, he means to create an ideal hero out of himself. In
light of what he says it takes to create an ideal hero — in other words, what is
required to paint a hero who is admirable enough to be an ideal to which we
should aspire — we are left to find it quite possible that he purposefully
overstates the extent to which we should imitate him, even when he maintains
that we all must examine and refuse to pay taxes. So we can develop substantial
doubts about what precisely he encourages us to do.
He sows such doubt because he has'*" to offer us only very vague
direction. The ideal hero he creates out of himself is heroic in large part for
finding out and pursuing his own way, and it is by following his own path that
he ends up refusing to pay taxes and engaging in examination. It is not only
fine, but best to imitate him in the limited sense of finding out and pursuing
one's own way, as he finds out and pursues his; but to imitate him in any fuller
sense would be to fail to imitate him well enough in the limited sense — and
thus to have set one's sights too low. My own path may not lead to the same
places that Thoreau's have led to; and imitation is so numbing that "One
cannot safely imitate the actions, as such, even of the wise and good," as he
writes in another context.'*' In focusing too heavily on what Thoreau does in
following his own path, we could get out of old mental ruts only to fall into
new ones. The way he guards against that danger is to open for us the
possibility that he exaggerates.
It is important to note that in taking measures to keep us from imitating
him too much, he hardly implodes the ideal he first sets up, despite the doubt
he can generate. As a matter of fact, even alone his considerable efforts to keep
us from lapsing into slavery to him are a testament to how resolutely he tries to
boost us toward the ideal, since reaching it, to repeat, fundamentally requires
finding one's own way. The ideal remains standing also insofar as — given his
claim that true accounts are extravagant relative to the norms of the
community to which we belong — he can always leave us wondering whether
his accounts are not ultimately extravagant, but extravagant merely to us; for
all we know, it could ultimately be the case that everyone should, indeed,
refuse to pay taxes and engage in solitary examination.
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However, since Thoreau nonetheless can, and does, present no more than
a dim ideal, shedding so little light for us, there is a problem. How are we to
find our path or be compelled enough to look for it in the first place.' It might
seem inevitable that we will stay in the dark hopelessly. After all, we tend to
think that navigators are able to head in the best direction only by first figuring
out precisely what their destination is and then calculating their way to it.
V. The Importance of Critique
Here it can grow plain why Thoreau's critiques are necessary. Notice he
says that it is "[i]n our most trivial walks [that] we are constantly, though
unconsciously, steering like pilots by certain well-known beacons and
headlands, and if we go beyond our usual course we still carry in our minds the
bearing of some neighboring cape. ..."'*^ Our walks turn out to be trivial when
we set forward having already decided where we should end up, because a
route that is too familiar only deepens our slumber before we start to live
deliberately, and a course which is too easily plotted threatens to lull us to
sleep once we have begun to do so. That is why Thoreau eventually left
Walden Pond, as he explains:
I left the woods for as good a reason as I went there.
... It is remarkable how easily and insensibly we fall
into a particular route, and make a beaten track for
ourselves. I had not lived there a week before my feet
wore a path from my door to the pond-side; and
though it is five or six years since I trod it, it is still
quite distinct. It is true, I fear that others may have
fallen into it, and so helped to keep it open. The
surface of the earth is soft and impressible by the feet
of men; and so with the paths which the mind travels.
How worn and dusty, then, must be the highways of
the world, how deep the ruts of tradition and
conformity!'*^
Even after centering our lives on examination, all of us, like Thoreau, stay
predisposed to return to old habits or develop new ones. In short, we can find
our way only by getting lost. Critique is an indispensable means of helping us
get and stay lost.
Thoreau has to critique the community first to provoke us to free
ourselves from it while it still enslaves us. As entrenched as we are in our ruts
and as hazy as he must keep the ideal he presents, it may not have sufficient
power by itself to lure us out of our confinement in the first place. He thus
also needs a way to help wrench us free, and by critiquing the culture that
holds us captive, he can spur us to walk out of slavery. His critiques are
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effective insofar as they open our eyes to the extent to which we are
imprisoned. A central function of the essay "Resistance to Civil Government,"
for example, is to heighten one's sense of being a subject. In reading the essay,
I can feel imprisoned especially upon the realization that I will probably have
to choose between remaining a subject and being literally sent to jail. Further,
it is significant that in Walden, Thoreau imagines that Walden Pond may have
been "called, originally, Walled-in Pond."'** In works such as Walden, as in
"Resistance to Civil Government," he highlights our imprisonment in order to
divest us of our ties to the culture which enslaves us. As he indicates therein,
"our lives must be stripped" of those ties in order to ultimately grow beautiflil
and full.'*5
Once we break free and take up the task of fmding our own way,
Thoreau's critiques, and our own, still are crucial. The ideal he lays out grows
no less hazy, and we need just as much as before to be alert to whatever
threatens our ability to stay awake, such as returning to enslavement or falling
back into mental ruts. Accordingly, we must navigate far less by means of a
lodestar than by figuring out which places to leave and what to avoid — and
critique makes it possible for us do so. Thoreau's decision to leave Concord,
like his later choice to leave Walden Pond, provides an example of why we may
leave a place. Part of his essay "Life Without Principle" points to reasons for
which we may avoid certain activities. In it, Thoreau bemoans trivialities and
stresses that when we have continually focused on them, we have "desecrated
ourselves" and left our minds "profaned." We are shaped to a large extent by
what occupies our attention, and when immersed in, say, newspaper stories,
gossip, and "conventionalities," one easily becomes habituated and dozy, and
it gets more difficult to live deliberately.'** Thoreau's critique here should
attune us to the need to "wash and purify" oneself,'*^ and thereby thwart
drowsiness, by avoiding trivialities. The importance of avoiding them can help
give us direction as we look for our path.
Since we must find our way in general primarily by determining where we
had better not be and what it is wiser for us not to do, instead of setding on a
precise destination, it is, indeed, the case that Thoreau emphasizes backward-
looking freedom, as opposed to forward-looking freedom. But it should now
be obvious that in this Thoreauvian picture, one seeks negative freedom simply
for the sake of gaining positive freedom. In other words, when navigating we
look backward just because we have to do so to get properly lost:
predetermining exacdy what our destination is would keep us from reaching it.
Our ultimate interest is in how well one can come to live once firmly
grounded, and our focus on debasement, helping us to get and stay lost,
should only serve as a heuristic aid.
Thoreau vigilantly takes measures to ensure that it becomes nothing more.
Given our tendency to fall into mental ruts, we could even get stuck looking
backward, forgetting that the purpose of looking backward is to move forward
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in the best direction. It is savvy of Thoreau, then, to level this criticism in
Walden's closing paragraphs: "Some would find fault with the morning-red, if
they ever got up early enough."'*' Shortly thereinafter, he adds that "The
fault-finder will find faults even in paradise."'** In indicting fault-finders,
Thoreau in effect critiques the very enterprise of critiquing, prompting us to
break free also from it if it should take us prisoner. Moreover, when his astute
readers detect the self-referential incoherence involved in finding fault with all
fault-finding — not to mention the irony in Thoreau's finding fault with it —
they may grow even more suspicious that he writes "extravagantly" and, in
turn, be less prone to imitate him too closely. Even in critiquing human
culture, Thoreau is careful to sec that we find our own way. Further, he not
only works to expose our enslavement, but also underscores the potential to
escape it. In Walden., for example, his critiques are interspersed with accounts
of how he has found his way, and he gives us strong encouragement, writing
that near the end of his first year at Walden, he saw the sun light up the
mist,''" and adding, for example: "I learned this, at least, by my experiment;
that if one advances confidently in the direction of his dreams, and endeavors
to live the life which he has imagined, he will meet with a success unexpected
in common hours."'" If we get and stay as free from mental ruts as critique
should help us be, he assures us, we can, indeed, reach knowledge.
Despite how lofty Thoreau's rhetoric can be at times, what he calls for is
more feasible than it might at first seem. He would simply have us do what it
takes to gain what he calls knowledge. On his terms, we are in the best
position to gain it when we live deliberately; but our own path would not
necessarily lead to an isolated pond or a wholly simplified life, and it might
even take us in certain directions Thoreau would avoid. No doubt, fully
governing ourselves might also require us to make what look like sacrifices, but
they would be worthwhile if he is right that gaining knowledge matters most.
Conclusion
In the end, helping us find our own way is one of Thoreau's principal
concerns. Contrary to what is often assumed, he is driven to serve other
people. It is in large part to benefit them that he works to cultivate himself,
holding that one must enrich oneself in order to be of genuine use to others.
That is evident mainly because his actions cohere with his account of what
people need the most. On his account, what we most need is to gain
knowledge — a sense of reality that renders our lives profoundly meaningful
— for once we have knowledge, our lives can start to become beautiful and
full. We lack total control over whether we gain it, but when we live
deliberately, it is far more likely that knowledge will come to us. The reason is
that we can reach knowledge only by losing the world in the sense of growing
disoriented, and living deliberately sets us up to lose the world in that respect.
Living deliberately requires serious reflection on what is best for oneself, and in
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carrying out such reflection, we come face to face with the possibility of living
in ways that are foreign to us. Earnesdy considering them can mean growing
bewildered and unsetded, though it can also wake us up enough to actually
live. We resist entertaining foreign possibilities, because we are entrenched in
certain habits of thought, many of which are inherited from, and reinforced
by, the culture in which we live. We must break free from our community's
influence on us, losing the world in an additional respect, in order to get lost
in the sense of growing disoriented.
Accordingly, for the most part, Thoreau performs his service to other
people by working to get them free from their community's influence. Not
wholly unlike Cicero and other figures in antiquity, he presents himself as an
exemplar, modeling a life of thinking for and governing oneself free of slavery
to others. The ideal, though, is fundamentally to find one's own way, so
Thoreau has to keep us from trying to imitate him too extensively. The
problem would lie in the strong temptation to unknowingly identify fmding
our own way with following the particular path that he follows, because his
path may not be our own. To guard against the danger, Thoreau leaves us to
wonder whether he exaggerates or is extravagant in maintaining, say, that we
all must carry out philosophical examinadon and refuse to pay taxes. Since the
ideal he erects thereby grows hazy, it alone may not be powerful enough to
draw us out of our habits of thought so that we can awaken and live
deliberately. Further, it would not work for us to try to find our way by using
the ideal as a lodestar, since our course would be easily plotted, and we have to
face mystery to stay adequately awake. Given that that is the case, we need a
means of navigating as we try to find our way.
Thoreau's cridques, then, play a vital role in his service to other people,
much as other rhetorical devices were integral to ancient spiritual guidance.
While, for example, Lucredus' violent descriptions stand to shock his readers
into seeing themselves more clearly and Socrates' confusing analogies may
leave Euthyphro more compliant, Thoreau's critiques should help us reclaim
and preserve our autonomy. On the one hand, they should first spur us to
escape the mental habits that our culture reinforces. On the other hand, they
should then allow us to stay on our path by reminding us of which places to
leave and what to avoid. In looking backward while navigadng, we do, indeed,
focus on what to get free from, but our ukimate interest is in getdng free for
what is best. Thoreau serves as our guide to self-culdvadon, prompdng us to
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